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Abstract 
 
Imperialism is primarily driven by a combination of public policies and accumulation regimes 
taking place within the domestic environment of the imperial state itself. As an international 
policy, however, imperialism aims at transforming other states' socio-economic and political 
orders, especially in the global periphery and semi-periphery, by way of transplanting there its 
own class model that prevailed at the metropolitan home. The two most important stylised 
and separable, but not separate, public policies of our times are that of Anglo-American neo-
liberalism, which drives post-Bretton Woods globalisation/financialisation, and that of 
German-Austrian ordoliberalism, which guides the process of European “integration”. The 
argument advanced here is that (Anglo-American) neo-liberalism and (German-Austrian) 
ordoliberalism are not stand-alone domestic policies but are instead consubstantial with 
imperial undertakings, the former project being wider and truly global in scope, whereas the 
latter is dominating the EU/Euro-zone and its immediate periphery (the Balkans/Eastern 
Europe and the MENA region). In this context, the article puts forth a qualitative critique of 
both public policies as imperial policies of domination, transformation and exploitation, 
buttressing regimes of permanent austerity and authoritarianism at home and permanent 
war and devastation abroad. 
     
Keywords: imperialism, new American imperialism (NAI), financialisation/globalisation, 
ordoliberalism, neo-liberalism, core-periphery relations, uneven (and combined) 
development 
 
Do international relations precede or follow (logically) fundamental social 
relations? There can be no doubt that they follow. Any organic innovation in 
the social structure through its technical-military expressions modifies 
organically absolute and relative relations in the international field too. 
 
Antonio Gramsci1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Imperialism has never been dissociated from the domestic political and social orders which it 
serves. It is sourced by a combination of public policies and internal accumulation regimes, 
themselves creating conditions of outward capitalist expansion penetrating other 
jurisdictions. The two most important accumulation regimes of our times pertain to Anglo-
American neo-imperialism and German-Austrian ordoliberalism. The former's ambition is to 
shape the domestic environments of every single state in the world after its own image. The 
                                                     
1 Gramsci, A., Selections from Prison Notebooks (edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell 
Smith) (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1996), p.176. 
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latter guides the process of European "integration" and manages the current Euro-zone crisis, 
although its ambition goes further embracing lands and geographies of Eastern Europe and 
the greater Middle East. This said, the aim of this article is to build an epistemic terrain 
composed of theoretical and descriptive categories drawn from the rich tradition of Marxian 
texts on imperialism in order to use this terrain to articulate a qualitative critique of 
contemporary Anglo-American neo-liberalism cum German-Austrian ordoliberalism.  
We consider this as a very important undertaking, not least because progressive, 
heterodox and post-Keynesian writings, although they have contributed to our knowledge of 
contemporary global and European capitalism, they have failed to connect their analyses with 
the notion of imperialism and its global crisis, especially vis-à-vis the rise of China.2 Our 
starting point is that neither neo-liberalism nor ordoliberalism stand alone as public policies 
within the domestic environment of core capitalist states; they are, instead, consubstantial 
with imperial undertakings aiming at transforming the internal socio-political order of all 
other states alongside the model of imperial metropolis. This, in turn, tends to accentuate 
core-core inter-imperial tensions and core-periphery conflicts. Moreover, due to the rise of 
China and the disintegrative tendencies within the Euro-Atlantic bloc, inter-imperialist, core-
core tensions have in recent years accentuated, witness, among others, the Brexit 
phenomenon and the Euro-zone crisis, which is a crisis of German-Austrian ordoliberalism 
failing to insulate the Euro-zone from the crisis of neo-liberal (Anglo-American) globalisation.    
The presentation order proposed serves our objectives: we will survey and select/de-
select key theories of imperialism in order to build the epistemic framework necessary to 
articulate a critique of neo-liberalism and ordoliberalism. The starting point will be a review 
of Marx's own theory of capitalism, which was put forth at the outset of Britain's international 
domination as a result of its industrial and trade supremacy. We will then move on to the 
works by Rudolf Hilferding, Nikolai Bukharin and V.I. Lenin, a phase in the development of 
capitalism that reflects the crisis of Britain's hegemony and of European imperialisms as a 
whole. After WWII and the rise of the USA in the position of global hegemony, our focus will 
shift westwards, looking at the work of such scholars as Paul Baran, Ernest Mandel, Immanuel 
Wallerstein and Nicos Poulantzas. We will then move on to review recent approaches to 
financialisation/globalisation and new American imperialism (NAI) by reviewing works by 
Giovanni Arrighi, David Harvey, Peter Gowan, Alex Callinicos and Leo Panitch. The discussion 
will enable us to put forth the conceptual and descriptive framework required so that a 
critique of Anglo-American neo-liberalism and German-Austrian ordoliberalism, as forms of 
contemporary imperialism and authoritarianism, could be advanced.  
 
 
The beginnings: Marx's theory of capital accumulation and European imperial expansion 
 
Capitalism is a dynamic social system and a mode of production based on the extraction of 
(absolute and relative) surplus-value that takes place in the material process of production, 
translated into a rate of profit for the enterprise. The rate of profit is the percentage return 
                                                     
2 See, among others, Subasat, T. (ed.), The Great Financial Meltdown (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Wolfson, 
2016), Martin H. and Gerald A. Epstein (eds) The Political Economy of Financial Crises (Oxford: O.U.P., 2013), 
Lapavitsas, C. et al., "Eurozone crisis: Beggar thyself and thy neighbour", Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern 
Studies, 12:4, (2010), pp. 321-373 Lapavitsas, C., Profiting without Producing (London: Verso, 2013) 
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on the total capital invested.3 Value and surplus-value can be produced only by workers and 
only in the material process of production. Technological innovation as such does not create 
value, although it facilitates its extraction deepening the rate of exploitation and the 
extraction of relative surplus-value. Yet value (and surplus-value) spread unevenly: workers 
are rewarded, via the wage system, much less than the capitalists because, as Marx put it in 
Capital quoting Ferdinando Galiani, "where equality exists there is no gain".4 This is the first 
key element of the capitalist system.  
However, the capitalist, that is, the personification of capital, is also structurally 
involved in competition with other capitalists (capitals) in open competitive markets.5 
Competition is a permanent feature of capitalism as a whole, whereby capitalism is 
understood as a social system. Here, too, the exchange values circulating in the market 
develop in an uneven way: some capitalists win and some others lose in the jungle of the 
market. This is the second key element of the capitalist mode of production. As a 
consequence, capitalists are facing a permanent opposition from workers, who aim at 
reducing the rate of exploitation and, therefore, the extraction of (absolute and relative) 
surplus-value achieving higher wages; and from other capitalists who are trying to out-
compete them in the market in their efforts to increase their sales and, as a consequence, to 
impact positively on profits. Facing these two challenges that tend to undermine their main 
raison d'être, that is, the extraction of high amounts of profit, the capitalist opts for constant 
innovation and expansion into new markets. Accumulation/centralization of capital occurs via 
constant expansion into national and international markets, especially in under-developed 
parts of the world that did not go through any industrial revolution.6 Blocs of capital, having 
established themselves in their country of origin through the process of "primitive 
accumulation", tend to face crises of over-accumulation as the re-investment of profits fails 
to produce new profits (returns). This happens because capitalists are forced to innovate to 
compete with other capitalists. But technological innovation displaces labour-power – the 
only source of value and surplus-value – from the production process and this has as a result 
the fall in the rate of profit (a counter-tendency is an increase in labour productivity and a 
reduction in unit labour costs, both of which increase the extraction of relative surplus-value). 
Thus, these blocs of capital seek expansion into new territories where profitable employment 
of labour-power, the only source value and surplus-value, can realize. Although Marx himself 
never used the term "imperialism", the fundamentals of a Marxist theory of imperialism can 
be found in Marx's own writings in Capital in which he sees capitalism as a dynamic social 
system prone to expand internationally in order to achieve high profit rates and, if need be, 
solve its over-accumulation crisis at home. 
This is a very promising start. Marx and Engels were writing at a time when Britain was 
the top world power, followed by other European powers, such as France, Germany and Italy. 
British imperialism was the political and ideological generalization of free trade and 
                                                     
3 It is beyond the scope of this article to entertain debates and controversies within Marxist and progressive 
scholarship. As a result, we give here this definition of the "rate of profit", which is broadly accepted among 
heterodox and post-Keynesian economists. 
4 Marx, K., Capital, v.1 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), p.261. 
5 This is germane to some of the issues raised by Alex Callinicos: see, Callinicos, A.,"Does capitalism need the 
state system?", Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 20:4 (2007), 533-549. Capital competition and state 
competition feed each other in the reproduction of global capitalist order. 
6 See, among others, Harvey, D., The New Imperialism (Oxford: O.U.P., 2003) and Pradella, L., "Imperialism and 
capitalist development in Marx's Capital", Historical  Materialism 21:2, (2013), pp.117-147. 
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corresponds to the competitive phase of it. Having secured the recruitment of local servile 
elites to govern favourable competition regimes for the multi-national companies of their 
respective countries, the practice of European imperial elites at the time was to divide among 
themselves the world peripheries of Africa, Asia and Latin America into economic and political 
zones of exploitation and control (this practice took on a more formal dimension in the inter-
imperial arrangements and secret treaties following the end of WWI). Thus, when later in the 
19th century the USA attempted to penetrate Asian markets in order to counter a serious 
economic contraction at home due to the over-accumulation crisis of the 1890s, European 
colonial powers resisted the attempt. This forced US Secretary of State, John Hay, to issue his 
"Open Door" notes in September and November 1899, urging European imperial powers to 
open up their markets in SE Asia and China to international competition.7 "Open Door" 
imperialism has since been an enduring feature of the USA's drive for global dominance, 
although it took on different forms after WWII and the crisis of the Bretton Woods system in 
the late 1960s (see below).  
 
Marxian theories of imperialism before and after WWI 
 
Rosa Luxemburg's argument deserves specific mentioning, not least because it sparked 
important controversies within Marxism influencing many generations, including David 
Harvey's more recent work. According to Luxemburg, there is a lack of sufficient demand to 
absorb the commodities produced and this, as opposed to Say's thesis, makes the gap 
between supply and demand unbridgeable.8 The solution is in what Luxemburg defines as the 
"dualist" nature of capital accumulation. The first aspect of capital accumulation concerns, 
among others, the relationship between the capitalist and the worker. The second aspect 
concerns the colonial policy of metropolises of capitalism, which is effectively the interaction 
between capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production. This second aspect of capital 
accumulation provides the solution to the under-consumption problem of the metropolises. 
Trade, investment and repatriation of profits from the under-developed areas of the world 
are essentially the form that modern imperialism acquires according to Luxemburg. In other 
words, imperialism means extreme exploitation, oppression and looting of non-capitalist, 
peripheral parts of the world.9 Luxemburg asserts that a precondition for the capitalism of 
the metropolises to exist and reproduce themselves is the subordination of non-capitalist, 
peasant peripheries and their insertion into a global market. Luxemburg's conclusion is that 
inasmuch as core capitalisms will eventually soak up the under-developed peripheries in their 
efforts to deal with crises of under-consumption, they will face automatic collapse once their 
extended reproduction via the exploitation of non-capitalist peripheries will cease to offer 
investment and profiteering outlets. As we shall see below, Harvey's argument on "new 
imperialism" builds almost entirely on Luxemburg's epistemic framework.  
                                                     
7 See the brilliant accounts by Williams, William A., The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: Norton, 
1972) and Layne, C., The Peace of Illusions. American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2006). 
8 Jean-Baptiste Say's liberal economic orthodoxy argued that "supply creates its own demand". See, Say, Jean B. 
(1834), A Treatise of Political Economy (Philadelphia: Grigg and Elliott, 1834), pp.288-96. As it is well known, John 
Maynard Keynes criticised this view in his General Theory, published in 1936. 
9 The classic reference here is Luxemburg’s work on the accumulation of capital written in 1913: Luxemburg, R., 
The Accumulation of Capital (London: Routledge, 1951).  
5 
 
Luxemburg, however, did not dwell on money and finance as key variables for a theory 
of imperialism. Hilferding did. His work includes a theory of money and finance built around 
the notion of "founder's profit", as Lapavitsas argued correctly;10 a description of the 
formation of "joint stock companies" generating a tendency to monopoly; and a theory of 
finance capital which he defined as the merger of industrial (productive enterprises) and 
financial (banking-money) capital. Discussing at length the role of the banks in the 
concentration/centralization of capital, Hilferding argued that the separation of commercial 
(merchant) and financial capital was one of the key features of the competitive phase of 
capitalism. Monopoly capitalism, Hilferding maintains, eliminates this separation giving way 
to finance capital. In the words of Hilferding, 
 
An ever increasing part of the capital of industry does not belong to the 
industrialists who use it. They are able to dispose over capital only through 
the banks, which represent the owners. On the other side, the banks have 
to invest an ever-increasing part of their capital in industry, and in this way 
they become to a greater and greater extent industrial capitalists. I call 
bank capital, that is, capital in money form which is actually transformed 
in this way into industrial capital, finance capital.11 
 
Clearly, at the dawn of the 20th century, capitalism had already overcome its competitive 
phase assuming monopolistic features. Nikolai Bukharin's work on imperialism, which 
preceded that of V.I. Lenin on the same subject - Lenin wrote the Introduction to Bukharin's 
work which became available and known only in 1927 - argues that monopoly capital marks 
a further intensification of competition among blocs of capital at the international level 
shifting the terrain of big capital competition from the national to international. Bukharin, 
same as Lenin, built his theory of imperialism by way of drawing from the work of Rudolf 
Hilferding and John Hobson, the latter being a radical liberal and not a Marxist. For Bukharin, 
who follows Hilferding, imperialism means penetration of banking capital into industry and 
formation of finance capital. This strategy, Bukharin argues, assists cartels to overcome over-
accumulation crises at home. What follows is a massive export of capital precisely because 
"in our era, the interests of finance capital demand first of all expansion of the home state 
territory, ie it dictates a policy of conquest, a pressure of military force, a line of 'imperialist 
annexation'".12 Bukharin asserts that capital, facing the prospect of "impossibility of doing 
business at home, the race for higher rates of profit" becomes the "motive power of world 
capitalism".13 Thus, commodities, services, finance and investments travel abroad in order to 
repatriate profits and values generated there. "England's policy in Egypt", Bukharin remarks, 
"the transformation of all of Egypt into a gigantic cotton plantation furnishing raw material 
for the English textile industry may serve as a striking illustration".14 Unlike Hilferding, 
however, Bukharin sees two historical capitalist processes at work: the first is what he calls 
"internationalization" and the second is what he calls "division of the world economy into 
                                                     
10 See his Profiting without Producing, op.cit., pp.46-58. 
11 See, Hilferding, R., Finance Capital (London: Routledge, 1981), p.225. Hilferding’s account was originally 
published in 1910. 
12Bukharin, N., Imperialism and World Economy (London and Sydney: Bookmarks, 2003), p.80. Bukharin’s work 
appeared in 1915. 
13 Ibid., p.86. 
14 Ibid., p.96 
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national blocs". The clash between the two tendencies of capitalism drives the system into 
war and breakdown. 
Lenin's work on imperialism aims at countering Karl Kautsky's theory of "ultra-
imperialism", which argued that the international tendency of finance capital is towards 
unification and international peace and not division and war. Thus, Kautsky thought that the 
great powers, in their efforts to deal with over-accumulation crises, would agree to conquer 
and exploit the world jointly rather than fighting over the division of it intensifying 
competition. Lenin, same as Bukharin and Leon Trotsky, was up against this theory. Lenin's 
argument had been that capitalism's tendency to develop in an uneven and combined way 
trumps any structural-linear tendency towards "ultra-imperialism". In his polemical essay "On 
the Slogan of a United States of Europe" in 1915, Lenin wrote that although "temporary 
agreements" between European capitalists are possible, this is for the purpose of 
"suppressing European socialism".15 In this essay, Lenin compared Europe to the USA and 
pointed to the stagnation of the former and the rapid development of the latter, thus 
implicitly recognising a power-shift away from the "old continent". A "United States of 
Europe", Lenin argued, if ever becomes possible, would be a reactionary organisation against 
the USA. All in all, uneven and combined development prevails and wars and conflict in 
capitalist history are inescapable. More specifically, progressive revolutions led by the 
working class break out in the weakest link of the capitalist imperial chain, which becomes so 
because of the historical concentration of many political, economic and ideological 
contradictions. The weakest link, according to Lenin, may not be a country of advanced 
capitalism but a country of the colonial periphery. Lenin charged Kautsky and the Second 
(Social Democratic) International, of which the Bolsheviks were a member, with betrayal of 
internationalist principles as they sided with their respective national bourgeoisies. In 1914 in 
the Reichstag Kautsky and the majority of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) voted 
for war credits endorsing Germany's imperialist war. Lenin's drive to break away from the 
Second International to set up the Third (Communist) International had had theoretical as 
well as political foundations. 
"The economic quintessence of imperialism", Lenin argued, "is monopoly capitalism". 
Monopolies, which spring from the banks, accelerate the capture of "the most important 
sources of raw materials" and sustain a colonial policy of annexation and division of the world 
among the great imperialist powers.16 Lenin espouses in full the thesis that imperialism is 
appropriation of international value and concentration of money capital in core capitalist 
countries. This, he argued, had as a result the creation of the idle and parasitic class of 
bondholders (rentiers), that is, "people who live by 'clipping coupons', who take no part 
whatever in production".17 Moreover, extra profits appropriated from colonies allows the 
funding of a "labour aristocracy" in the core countries, especially in England, a fact which leads 
the socialist movement to adopt reformist, economistic (e.g. fighting for higher wages alone 
without politicizing the struggle) and nationalist attitudes instead of internationalist and 
revolutionary/radical ones. In this context, Lenin saw that inter-imperialist rivalries lead to 
the decay and contraction of capitalism as a global imperial system and, as such, is the highest 
stage of capitalist development.  
                                                     
15 Lenin, V.I. (1915), "On the slogan for a United States of Europe", 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1915/aug/23.htm (accessed on 12 April 2017). 
16 Lenin, V.I., Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (New York: International Publishers, 1939), pp.123-
25. 
17 Ibid., p.100. 
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Theorising imperialism after WWII 
 
The age of industry and free trade was at the same time the age of Britain's international 
supremacy. But the advent of Germany and the USA onto European and world stage 
undermined Britain's position. Moreover, WWI turned Britain, as well as France, into a debtor 
nation. Germany had a Treaty obligation to pay Britain and France for war reparations. In 
turn, Britain and France were to pay the USA for their war debts. None of this worked out.18 
Germany became increasingly a revisionist power and the USA began closing off its markets 
in order to defend its producers from depreciating European currencies. The USA began 
raising tariffs in 1921 and 1922, whereas the Smoot-Hawley tariff law of 1930 pushed many 
other countries into retaliatory measures. It was not Nazi Germany that had first raised tariff 
walls but the liberal and "Open Door" United States. It appeared that pre-WWII Marxist 
theories of imperialism got it, more or less, right: as Bukharin and Lenin argued, monopoly 
capitalism and division of the world into zones of colonial control accentuated inter-
imperialist contradictions leading to the breakdown of the imperial order and war. But the 
enthronement of new American imperialism in the heights of global supremacy after WWII 
and its military adventures in Korea, the Suez Canal and Vietnam necessitated new Marxist 
approaches.  
The new American imperialism (NAI) is informal. Unlike old-fashioned formal 
European colonial rule of the under-developed global peripheries, NAI set up a novel strategy 
in the 1940s, whose aims can be summed up as follows: preventing repetition of the 1929 
financial crash by setting up institutions that can act as  "lenders of last resort" (e.g. the IMF); 
tying down European colonial powers under the USA's global hegemonic drive so that 
competing colonial blocs become a thing of the past (the USA had been very critical of 
European colonialism); reconstructing the social economies of the two ends of Eurasia 
(Western Europe and Japan) integrating them in a global capitalist economy under the 
supremacy of American multinationals, the monetary aspect of which rested on the 
hegemony of the dollar established at Bretton Woods in 1944; and engineering a "Soviet 
threat", a purely ideational scheme, in order to consolidate its grip on Europe via the creation 
of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), a security alliance cultivating hostility against 
the Soviet Union but whose primary aim was to keep Europe under America's grip while 
putting pressure on the Soviets to open up their market to Western multinationals.19   
 
What we can call as "The American School of Marxism" is perhaps best represented by the 
works of Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy and Harry Magdoff, which has dwelled extensively and to 
the present day on the new international political economy of the American empire. Their 
                                                     
18 On this issue, a very useful account is offered by economist Michael Hudson: see, Hudson, M., Super-
Imperialism (London: Pluto press, 2003) 
19 I am relying here on two classic and complementary accounts: Kolko, G., The Politics of War (NY: Random 
House, 1968) and Gowan, P., The Global Gamble (London: Verso, 1999). Gabriel Kolko offers the historical 
grounding for Peter Gown to advance a Marxisant view about NATO and the USA after the end of the Cold War 
based on the exclusion of Russia from European politics and a surrender of its social economy to western 
multinationals and neo-liberalism (see especially Gowan’s critique of “shock therapy” policy inspired by Jeffrey 
Sachs). 
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work on imperialism and the economic and financial crises from the 1960s onwards, 
represents a fairly coherent body of thought, which found expression also in the longest 
standing socialist journal, Monthly Review, founded in 1949 by Paul Sweezy and Francis Otto 
Matthiessen.  
The American School introduces the concept of "surplus". For our purposes here, 
which is to build an epistemic framework of concepts and historical categories defining the 
notion of imperialism, it is very important. In the context of Baran's and Sweezy's work, the 
concept of "surplus" is defined in three ways20: i) as the difference between current net 
output and current consumption ("actual surplus"); ii) as the amount that a pro-growth policy 
would devote to investment without substantially reducing consumption ("potential 
surplus"); iii) as the difference between an optimal level of output and an optimal level of 
consumption ("planned surplus", applicable only to socialist regimes). American monopoly 
capitalism (cum imperialism) is stagnating because the (i + ii) surplus generated is failing to 
finance demand, ie the purchasing power of workers. Thus, there is a chronic lack of demand, 
which can be temporarily solved by military adventures and the absorption by the state of 
large chunks of surplus. Under these conditions of chronic lack of demand and efforts to solve 
it in a militaristic-imperialist way, monopolies stagnate also because of incessant competition. 
However, Sweezy and Baran argued that monopolistic competition withers away as the firms 
become fewer and fewer in their effort to exploit under-developed peripheries of the world.21 
At this point, their argument comes very close to the Kautskyite thesis of "ultra-imperialism", 
which was refuted by Bukharin and Lenin. It is worth noting that, according to Baran, the 
under-developed peripheries tend to remain such because countries of the core discourage 
competition of manufactured products imported from the advanced imperial core. In 
addition, local mercantile interests (large import consortia, sub-contractors, go-betweens) in 
the periphery, what Baran called comprador bourgeoisie, are attached to the foreign capital 
of metropolises undermining endogenous industrial development. Thus, under-development 
persists and the periphery finds it always impossible to catch-up with the developed core. 
This is a very important insight which, with all necessary qualifications (see below), finds 
expression and veracity in today's global South and East, certainly within the Euro-zone and 
also within the state formations proper.  
But the American School includes many tendencies, the most important of which are 
dependency theories and world system theories. They became prominent through mainly the 
works of Andre Gunder Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein and, later, Christopher Chase-Dunn. 
Frank's main argument, following to a large extent Baran's work, was that under-development 
is closely tied to development, being effectively the two sides of the same coin. "Comprador" 
administrations, especially in Latin America, are tied to, and dependent on the imperialist 
core. Large import consortia in periphery countries are profoundly dependent on their 
imperial suppliers becoming the agencies of foreign capital within peripheral state formations 
controlling the political elites of those states. In the end, dependent peripheries remain 
under-developed and dependent, Frank argued, because they "lack access to their own 
surplus",22 this being appropriated by the metropolises. So entrenched, according to Frank, 
has become the dependency of the periphery from the core that even prospects of 
                                                     
20 See especially, Baran, P., The Political Economy of Growth (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), pp.128-33. 
Baran’s work was originally published in 1957. 
21 See, Baran P. and Paul Sweezy, Monopoly Capitalism (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968). 
22 Frank, Andre G., Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (London: Modern Reader Paperbacks, 
1969), p.9. 
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revolutionary emancipation of the colonies as predicted by Lenin become remote. In Latin 
America, "neo-imperialism and monopoly capitalist development are drawing and driving the 
entire bourgeois class (...) into ever closer economic and political alliance, and dependence 
on, the imperialist metropolis".23 The gist of Frank's argument, as well as many other 
dependency and world system theorists, such as the important work by Chase-Dunn, Global 
Formation,24 is that core capitalist countries in history, such a Britain and the USA, having 
recruited local comprador elites to serve their interests in government and the economy, 
create such levels of dependency and subordination that make impossible any radical change 
and serious industrial development in periphery states. Wallerstein's approach is similar, 
although he insisted that capitalism is a world system and not simply a social system. Nation-
states and cultural systems are profoundly inter-dependent and inter-woven into a world 
totality characterised by commodity exchange relations and a diversified social/technical 
division of labour. Wallerstein went on to divide the (capitalist) world system into three tiers 
of states: core states; periphery states; and semi-periphery states.25 Core states, because of 
their strong administrative and government apparatuses, realise the transfer of surplus from 
the periphery, thus further strengthening the core. Core states manipulate the periphery by 
restricting its ability to protect its industry and imposing monopolistic restrictions. The so-
called "import-substitution industrialization" attempted by Latin American governments and 
elsewhere was anathema to American imperialism as it gave Latin American economies a 
competitive edge vis-á-vis American multinationals as well as potentially sovereign local 
governments uncontrollable by the metropolitan centre. Semi-peripheral states are seen by 
Wallerstein as a kind of "middle class" or "labour aristocracy of states", which prevent 
polarisation of the world-system into extremely poor and extremely rich areas. This is quite 
functional for servicing the needs of the core, because extreme polarisation may lead to the 
radicalisation of the periphery and the success of Marxist revolutions.  
A critique of these arguments from "orthodox" Marxian positions was developed by 
Nicos Poulantzas and Ernesto Laclau but we find that the overall contribution of the American 
school adds value to our effort to construct an epistemic framework defining the concept of 
imperialism in today's financialised capitalism.26 As we shall see later, Poulantzas himself, 
despite criticisms to this approach, which rested on the premise that world system theorists 
emphasise market relations at the expense of the "mode of production", adopts the term 
"comprador bourgeoisie" by way of integrating it into his own analytical framework. Thus, 
implicitly, Poulantzas adopts a dependency framework in his analyses of transatlantic 
economic relations (core-core relations) and North-South relations (core-periphery relations).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
23 Ibid., p.343. 
24 Chase-Dunn, C., Global Formation. Structures of the World-Economy (Oxford: Rowaman & Littlefield, 1998). 
25 Wallerstein, I., The Modern World System (New York: Academic Press, 1974) 
26 See, Poulantzas, N., Classes in Contemporary Capitalism (London: NLB, 1978), first published in 1974; and 
Laclau, E., Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory (London: NLB, 1977) 
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The "long 1960s": Ernest Mandel, Nicos Poulantzas and current debates on Anglo-American 
neo-liberalism, financialisation and new imperialism  
 
Since the early 1960s, the USA began having a persistent balance of payments problem -which 
continues to date - losing its status as a creditor power. With American capitalism being 
enveloped into a debt spiral, President Nixon cut the Gordian knot: in August 1971 gold 
convertibility to the dollar was suspended as the fixed exchange rates system could no longer 
hold, letting America's national currency devalue and float freely into global currency 
markets. By early-to-mid-1970s the Western economies entered into stagnation 
accompanied by high inflation, the so-called stagflation period. It seemed that the monopoly 
stagnation thesis of the American School got it right. It also seemed that the Marxist "law" of 
uneven (and combined) development held water, since Western Europe and Japan, after 
being assisted by the USA in the 1940s to recover, started competing with her on an equal 
footing.27 Prominent Marxists, such as Ernst Mandel, saw in these developments the 
beginning of the decline of America's imperial system. Let us quote his rationale at length:      
 
The law of uneven development led to an increasing decline in the 
ability of American commodities to compete with those of the USA's 
most important imperialist rivals (...). The foundering of the Bretton 
Woods system shows that the whole international credit expansion 
based on the use of the paper dollar as a world currency could collapse 
like a house of cards. It is a sign of the growing insecurity of national 
credit expansion. [There is] a contradiction between the role of the 
dollar as the buffer of the US industrial cycle and its role as a world 
currency. Its first role implies permanent inflation; its second role 
maximum stability. It was possible for the system to survive so long as 
dollar inflation was very mild and American labour productivity 
unchallenged. But both conditions were gradually eliminated (...). The 
insecurity of the world economy today finds expression in intensified 
international competition, which in turn corresponds to the relative 
decline in the preponderance of the USA.28 
 
Clearly, Mandel and many other Marxists, including world system theorists and especially 
Frank in his last book, ReOrient,29 although having diverging theoretical and empirical 
premises, agreed that the USA entered a period of terminal, albeit slow and protracted, 
decline since the 1970s. The late Frank, in particular, challenged the Euro-centric character of 
Marxist political economy and suggested a macro-historical and macro-sociological reading 
of global capitalism pointing to the significance and centrality of Asia over the last 1,000 years. 
                                                     
27 One key work here is that by Marxist economic historian, Robert Brenner. See, Brenner, R., The Economics of 
Global Turbulence (London: Verso, 2006) [first exposition of the argument in a single issue of New Left Review, 
1988, I: 229 (1998), pp.1-265)]. However, it is not the only one and certainly not one of the first to tackle global 
economic competition as a source of the decline of US economy. See, for instance, the work by Klaus Busch in 
Germany: Busch, K., Die Krise der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (Hamburg: Verlag); or that by Andrew Glynn and 
other Keynesian and Marxist scholars in England in the 1970s. In France, I would single out the wok by Alain 
Lipietz and others from the so-called “Regulation School”. 
28 Mandel, E., Late Capitalism (London: NLB, 1975), p.464-65. 
29 Frank, Andre G., ReOrient (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998) 
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In his earlier work written with Barry Gills, Frank sees Europe's and the West's domination of 
global political economy as a fleeting moment in the gigantic macro-historical scheme of his 
analysis in which China and other Asian civilizations played a far more significant role 
expanding the beginnings of the world's interacting structures into five millennia.30 Arrighi's 
last work, Adam Smith in Beijing,31 which is dedicated to Frank, sets the record straight: there 
is a clear power-shift to China since the era of financialization/globalization that followed that 
of stagflation in the 1970s marks a hegemonic transition in the global system the same way 
as the financial crisis of 1929 marked the terminal decline of the British empire and the 
passage to American hegemony. Arrighi follows to a large extent the French historical school 
around Fernand Braudel and its cyclical, long durée, approach.  
Poulantzas, one of the most sophisticated neo-Marxists, although subscribing to some 
key premises of the American School – for example, Poulantzas accepts the definition of 
comprador capital in the subordinated peripheries and the core/periphery dichotomy per se 
– he criticised it on grounds that it "underestimates the inter-imperialist contradictions 
resulting from uneven development", thus becoming a "left-wing version of the Kautskyite 
theory of 'ultra-imperialism'".32 His most important contribution, however, on the subject of 
imperialism and transatlantic relations had been his critique of Mandel and the way in which 
he analyses American hegemony in Europe.  
Poulantzas criticises Mandel in that he overlooks the nature of American investment 
in Europe, which is mostly direct investment, and not portfolio investment, "taking control of 
firms and enterprises".33 This is not the case with the majority of European investments in the 
USA, Poulantzas argued. This means that "American capital in Europe is effectively multiplied 
by its cumulated value and by the reinvestment of profits on the spot". The fact that American 
exports within the imperial core are in decline does not mean that the US economy is in 
decline or that American supremacy will end in the near future. Moreover, most firms and 
enterprises in Europe, especially in West Germany, are under American control but Mandel 
makes the statistical mistake to count as "European" exports the "exports of American-
controlled firms in the European countries".34 In other words, American capital dominates 
Europe and, in effect, according to Poulantzas's powerful formulation, “US capitalism turns 
all states into its relays: the states themselves assume responsibility for the interests of the 
dominant imperialist capital in its extended development actually within the "national" 
formation.35 
This was (and is) the reason - one could argue even today - behind Europe's impotence 
to stand up to the USA in security and defence matters and build an independent security 
presence in Eurasia, albeit reactionary, as Lenin predicted back in 1915; or to move on to plan 
                                                     
30 Frank, Andre G. and Barry K. Gills (eds), The World System. Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand? (London: 
Routledge, 1993).  
31 Arrighi, G., Adam Smith in Beijing (London: Verso, 2007). For a critical appraisal of this work, see Vassilis K. 
Fouskas and Bülent Gökay, The Fall of the US Empire (London: Pluto press, 2012). 
32 Poulantzas, N., op.cit., pp.38-9. 
33 Ibid., p.51. 
34 Ibid., p.55. 
35  Poulantzas, N., "Internationalization of capitalist relations and the nation-state" in Jacques Martin (ed. 2008), 
The Poulantzas Reader (London: Verso, 2008), p.245. Poulantzas’ original text appeared in 1973. 
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independently a monetary architecture as outlined by the Werner Report of 1969-70, a move 
that failed spectacularly.36  
The debates about the economic decline of the USA that were inaugurated by Marxist 
intellectuals in the 1960s and 1970s, as well as issues concerning the retreat of democracy in 
Europe and globally (see below) reverberate to the present day and it is in this sense that we 
can talk of "the long 1960s". For instance, Leo Panitch, Sam Gindin, Ray Kiely and many others, 
especially scholars contributing to Socialist Register, follow, by and large, Poulantzas's 
positions.37 Others, such as James Petras, John Weeks and, to a certain degree, David Harvey, 
side with the "declinists".38 Post-structuralist approaches to the issue of American Empire, 
such as that by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri are arguably espousing a version of Kautsky's 
position in that they see America as a transnational agent that has made inter-imperial 
conflict obsolete.39  
Having said this, a distinctive place in contemporary Marxist debates on imperialism 
and international relations is occupied by the work of the late Peter Gowan.40 Although 
Gowan subscribes to the declinist argument in the sense that the USA does no longer have 
the economic power it used to enjoy in the 1940s and 1950s due to the relative ascendance 
of other caucuses of capital accumulation (e.g. South-east Asia), he nevertheless argues that 
anticipating the terminal decline of the USA is rather premature.41 In a way, Gowan's work 
provides a splendid definitional framework for the global (and domestic) public policy of 
Anglo-American neo-liberalism after the end of the Bretton Woods system. 
 
                                                     
36 Poulantzas had also developed an original heterodox theory of the state. Breaking away from orthodox Marxist 
positions that see the state as an instrument in the hands of the bourgeoisie manipulated at will, he defines the 
state as the material condensation of social relations and an extended terrain of strategic action in which social 
struggle unfolds. Further, he argues that the capitalist state has always been structurally embedded in the 
social/technical division of labour and, participating in the extended reproduction of the capitalist relation others 
froms of production, it amalgamates social struggle. This insight is significant in that it allows Poulantzas to 
elaborate the notion of "authoritarian statism". Writing during the years of the decline of Keynesian policy-
making, the retreat of the labour movement and the failure of "historic compromise" in Italy, Poulantzas seemed 
to have foreseen the retreat of democracy and the coming of a neo-liberal executive over-loaded with a deeply 
authoritarian public policy. About the same period of time, Michel Foucault sheds light on ordoliberalism (see 
below), which is the German-Austrian version of neo-liberalism, what others call the "social market economy" 
or the "Freiburg School". Foucault sees a relative juxtaposition between Anglo-American neo-liberalism, what 
he often calls as "American anarcho-liberalism" and German-Austrian ordoliberalism, although he fails to define 
with precision the key features of each public policy set out to dominate the West and the globe, following the 
stagflation of the 1970s.    
37 See, Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, op.cit., Kiely, R., Rethinking Imperialism (New York: Palgrave),  
38 See in particular, Weeks, J., "A global approach to the global financial crisis" in Turan Subasat, op.cit., pp.97-
115; Petras, J. and Henry Veltmeyer, Globalization Unmasked (London: Zed books, 2001). It should be noted that 
the same sort of debates take place within the realist school of IR, especially in the USA, but we cannot elaborate 
on this topic here due to lack of space. For a brief introduction on this, see Vassilis K. Fouskas and Constantine 
Dimoulas, Greece, Financialization and the EU. The Political Economy of Debt and Destruction (New York: 
Palgrave, 2013), Part I. 
39 Hardt, M. and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000); Hardt, M. and Antonio 
Negri, Multitude (New York: Penguin, 2004). 
40 See his The Global Gamble, op.cit., as well as his "Economics and Politics within the capitalist core and the 
debate on the new imperialism" (2007), mimeo, and A Calculus of Power (London: Verso, 2010). 
41 Alan Cafruny and Magnus Ryner are very close to Gowan's position, although this is not acknowledged. See, 
for instance, their The European Union and Global Capitalism (New York: Palgrave, 2016).    
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According to Gowan, the fall of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 was a deliberate move on 
the part of the Nixon administration to place the entire global political economy on a dollar 
standard in alliance with the petro-oligarchies of the Gulf region, especially Saudi Arabia. In 
this context, money and credit unleashed, placing the Wall Street (and the City of London) at 
the centre of an expanding financial operation network across the globe, something which 
Gowan called "Dollar-Wall Street Regime" (DWSR).42 Thus, neo-liberalism sparked from 
within the domestic environment of two core states, Britain and the USA, although the first 
experiment of it was in a peripheral country, in Pinochet's Chile. As a form of domestic public 
policy, neo-liberalism entailed, first and foremost, liberalisation of the financial and banking 
sectors, extensive privatisations, welfare retrenchment, and a ferocious fight against inflation 
and Fordist (high) wages. It adumbrated, in other words, a coming regime of permanent 
austerity, insulating economic policy-making from negotiation and social struggle, thus 
prescribing a de-politicisation of social and political economy: policy reforms had to be seen 
as a quantifiable collection of charts and numbers in support of the supply-side of the market, 
the only one that could foster growth. In this respect, the state had to be strong and assume 
an authoritarian turn in order to transform the demand-led Keynesian constitutional 
settlements of the post-war period, a process that Stephen Gill and other scholars described 
as "new Constitutionalism".43 This model, also described as "The Washington Consensus", or 
"shock therapy", is especially embracing periphery states and zones44 and buttressed the 
transition to market economy of all former Communist states. Thus, it spread across the world 
re-defining the global accumulation regime by defining the policy contours in every single 
state formation. This all altered dramatically the balance of power in favour of capital. 
International norms and regulations, too, followed suit. By 1994, the post-war GATT (General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) regime was reformed into the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), ensuring that "Open Door" WTO norms and discipline are adopted by all members of 
the "free trade" globalisation club.  
In agreement with Robert Brenner, Gowan assesses that American and Western 
capitalism has still to exit from the over-accumulation crisis into which it entered in the late 
1960s. He captures America's economic decline in relative and highly qualified terms. By 
virtue of the centrality of the dollar in a floating exchange rates regime, Gowan, sums up a 
crucial argument from the radical debates of the 1970s, namely, that the American Treasury 
collects trillions of dollars from a number of tributaries around the world by way of having 
their surpluses invested in T-bills. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Germany, Japan and China 
hold trillions of dollars of American debt, which in turn helps the USA to finance its internal 
and external deficits and build its military bases around the world free of charge.45 Further, 
the DWSR is in a position to engineer crises in various hot spots and economic caucuses, such 
as South-East Asia, and then employ bail-out strategies spearheaded by the IMF itself, which 
is an extension of the American Treasury. In this way, the USA deepens the dependency of 
various world regions on its financial operations. But the new American imperialism, 
according to Gowan, does not have only financial-economic aspects. Influenced by the work 
                                                     
42 The Global Gamble, op.cit., pp.19-59. 
43 See, Gill, S. & A. Claire Cutler (eds), New Constitutionalism and World Order (Cambridge: C.U.P., 2014). 
44 Roy-Mukherjee, S., "Connecting the dots: The Washington Consensus and the 'Arab Spring'", Journal of Balkan 
and Near Eastern Studies, 17:2, April 2015. 
45 Years later, Yanis Varoufakis gave currency to this well-known and valid argument with his "Global Minotaur" 
metaphor; see, Varoufakis, Y., The Global Minotaur, (London: Zed books, 2011) and also his And the Weak Suffer 
What They Must? (London: Vintage, 2016). 
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of the revisionist historian, Gabriel Kolko, Gowan insisted that the US system of global 
imperial governance has also political and ideational dimensions. The post-WWII (informal) 
imperial system built by the USA did not seek domination over an ensemble of independent 
European and Asian imperialisms mimicking previous colonial arrangements led by Britain 
and France. Quite the opposite, in fact: the new American imperialism, following the 
pioneering strategic thought of such practitioners in the 1940s as Dean Acheson and Paul 
Nitze, aimed at primacy, that is, a form of hub-and-spoke system of power in which the US is 
the centre of global power and decision-making with all other powers of both the core and 
the periphery following the American lead. In this respect, Gowan sees NATO as a security 
structure that institutionalizes the dependency of the EU upon the USA. In terms of ideational 
undertakings, the USA has in the timespan of fifty years developed two ideational schemes: 
reminiscent of the friend-enemy binary elaborated by Carl Schmitt in his The Concept of the 
Political,46 the USA launched an ideational "war on Communism" during the Cold War, only 
to be substituted by the rhetoric of "human rights" and the "war on terror" after the terrorist 
attacks on the USA on 11 September 2001. 
David Harvey, who endorses Gowan's analyses, builds on the contribution of Rosa 
Luxemburg. He argues that capitalist expansion and development require always "less 
economically developed" geographies to exploit, geographies and spaces that are "outside" 
the mode of production of the dominant world power. Thus, "primitive accumulation" - 
violence and privatization of land, violent commodification of labour-power, colonial 
appropriation of assets and manipulation of national debts etc. - is a recurrent phenomenon 
in capitalist history and advances anytime the capitalist centre needs to solve crises of over-
accumulation at home and reverse profitability losses. Let us quote his argument at length: 
 
Some of the mechanisms of primitive accumulation that Marx 
emphasized have been fine-tuned to play an even stronger role now 
than in the past. The credit system and finance capital became, as 
Lenin, Hilferding, and Luxemburg all remarked at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, major levers of predation, fraud, and thievery. The 
strong wave of financialization that set in after 1973 has been every 
bit as spectacular for its speculative and predatory style. Stock 
promotions, ponzi schemes, structured asset destruction through 
inflation, asset-stripping through mergers and acquisitions, and the 
promotion of levels of debt incumbency that reduce whole 
populations, even in the advanced capitalist countries, to debt 
peonage, to say nothing of corporate fraud and dispossession of 
assets (the raiding of pension funds and their decimation by stock and 
corporate collapses) by credit and stock manipulations - all of these 
are central features of what contemporary capitalism is about. The 
collapse of Enron dispossessed many of their livelihoods and their 
pension rights. But above all, we have to look at the speculative 
raiding carried out by hedge funds and other major institutions of 
                                                     
46 Schmitt, C., The Concept of the Political (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996). The book appeared 
in 1932. Schmitt, whose ideology was deeply racist and was also a member of the Nazi party, has written very 
important works in the field of political and legal theory.  
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finance capital as the cutting edge of accumulation by dispossession 
in recent times (my emphasis).47 
 
Alex Callinicos corroborates Harvey's and Gowan's argument by asserting that in this slow and 
protracted declining period America entered since the late 1960s, other capitalist centres of 
power, such as Russia and China, may challenge America's still dominant economic and 
military position. Callinicos, who is influenced by Bukharin and attempts at driving a wedge 
between Marxist and realist theories of IR, prefers the term "geo-political competition" to 
that of "inter-imperialist rivalries" and argues that "capitalist imperialism is best understood 
as the intersection of economic and geopolitical competition".48 But the issue of 
"financialisation", especially if we factor in recent heterodox and post-Keynesian debates on 
the subject, is the most interesting one.  
Historically, finance gains currency when the real economic sector (commerce, 
manufacturing, agriculture) fails to register high levels of profitability and recedes, relying 
overwhelmingly on finance. Entrepreneurs switch to financial activity and speculative 
arbitrage - what Marx used to call "money begetting money" - because it is there that they 
could achieve high returns on their invested capital. The financialisation of non-financial 
enterprises constitutes a major new development in contemporary capitalism.49 Under 
financialization, the service sector and all professions attached to it (banks, legal and 
accountancy services, head-hunters, asset and equity managers and personnel etc.) 
proliferate. Services become the backbone of the economy and interest-bearing capital 
spreads across economy and social reproduction.50 Yet, financial and speculative profiteering 
was and remains the most vulnerable sector in a capitalist economy and is highly susceptible 
to crises and boom and bust cycles. In addition, it is not conducive to real economic growth 
as it operates through a devaluation of labour-power, post-Fordist regimes of flexible capital 
accumulation and the domination of services sector.51 In other words, neo-liberal 
financialisation tends to eliminate competition between capital and labour, yet augmenting 
it among enterprises and factions of capital. One of the most prominent Marxist groups that 
offered valuable analyses on the neo-liberal crisis of financialisation that erupted in 2007-08 
is the new generation of scholars of the American School. John Bellamy Foster and Fred 
Magdoff, among others, and many contributors to Monthly Review offered precious insights 
on the first global crisis of the regime of Anglo-American financialisation.  
Following the work of Baran and Sweezy on monopoly capital, which argued that the 
natural condition of the monopoly capitalist economy is stagnation, Foster and Magdoff saw 
financialization as a "shift in gravity of the economy from production to finance".52 As the 
superstructure of the monopoly, financialization, an extreme form of commodification of 
non-material commodities (securities, derivatives, special vehicles etc.), intensifies the 
                                                     
47 The New Imperialism, op.cit., p.147. 
48 Callinicos, A., "Does capitalism need the state system?", op.cit., p.545; see also, Callinicos, A., Imperialism and 
Global Political Economy (Cambridge: Polity, 2010). 
49 See especially, Lapavitsas, C., Profiting without Producing, op.cit. 
50 Fine, Ben (2017), "The material and culture of financialization", New Political Economy, 4:22 (2017), pp.371-
82. 
51 Lipietz, A., "The post-Fordist world: labour relations, international hierarchy and global ecology", Review of 
International Political Economy, 4:1, (1997), 1-29. 
52 Foster, Bellamy John and Fred Magdoff, The Great Financial Crisis (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2009), 
p.18. 
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monopoly's tendency towards stagnation and crisis. US imperialism, according to their 
analyses, is the imperialism of "monopoly-finance capital" whose underlying tendency since 
the 1980s is the massive growth of debt relative to GDP. Differentiating themselves from post-
Keynesian approaches which tend to reduce financialization to a mere speculative activity 
prone to crisis and implosion,53 Foster and Magdoff insist that the underlying cause of the US 
imperialism is not simply financialization but the stagnation tendencies of monopoly capital 
since the 1970s under the new regime of "monopoly-finance capital". Thus, contrary to a 
tendency that sees financialization as an independent profiteering activity with minimal or no 
connection to the real economic sector,54 Foster and Magdoff connect financialization with 
the erosion of the base of the real economy and analyse the explosive mix of the stagnation 
of the monopoly and the corrosive effects of the financialization of it which deepen its 
stagnation further. In essence, and contrary to the view of Leo Panitch, Sam Gindin and 
others, the new generation of the American School argues that neo-liberal financialization 
failed to solve the over-accumulation crisis of the 1970s, that is, the stagnation of monopoly 
capitalism.  
 
 
Germany, ordoliberalism and the Eurozone crisis 
 
The "success" of Anglo-American neo-liberalism, its financial sites being the Wall Street and 
the City of London as offshore money-hubs par excellence, rested on excessive financial 
operations at home and abroad; excessive speculative arbitrage; excessive re-cycling of 
fictitious capital appropriating international value creating the "debt-driven" growth of the 
1990s and early 2000s as argued by Robert Brenner; and excessive production of legislation 
and norms at both national and global levels aiming, among others, at transplanting their 
politico-economic and ideational orders of neo-liberal policies across the globe. In the 
relevant codified jargon, all this is called "structural adjustment programmes", "rule of law" 
and, in the case of embattled peripheries and war zones, "transitional justice". These 
activities, it should be said, coupled with military interventions in key neuralgic areas of the 
globe, have spectacularly failed to regulate the structural contradictions of capital despite the 
indisputable defeat of the labour movement in the 1980s.55 In addition, they failed to arrest 
the slow and protracted decline of the Western economies as a whole. 
The "success" of German-Austrian ordoliberalism rested on the victory of the 
economic model of "social market economy", which Germany managed to transpose onto the 
EEC/EC/EU and even beyond, and after having prevailed over France, especially after Francois 
Mitterrand's famous U-turn in 1983. The (secret and open) negotiations between French and 
German delegations in the 1980s over the thorny issue of EMU and the monetarist criteria 
firmly enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty secured Germany's ordoliberal hegemony in the EU. 
Time and again, as with the Anglo-American hegemonic design, the aim of German-Austrian 
ordoliberalism is the transformation of the domestic environment of European states making 
it conform to their own ordoliberal socio-economic model. This remark alone suffices to 
                                                     
53 One could argue that this is the case with the essays in the book edited by Martin Wolfson and Gerald Epstein; 
see, Wolfson, Martin H. and Gerald A. Epstein, The Political Economy of Financial Crises (Oxford: O.U.P., 2012).   
54 Lapavitsas's work on financialisation tends, at times, to disconnect the concept from the real economy, 
although this is not always the case. See Fouskas, Vassilis K. (2014) "Globalisation = Financialization. Review of 
Costas Lapavitsas, Profiting without Producing", The Political Quarterly, 85:4, (2014), 456-462. 
55 See, especially, Sassoon, D., One Hundred Years of Socialism (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996). 
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define both public policies as imperialist. But there are more reasons militating in favour of 
such a characterisation.    
The global financial crisis of 2007-08 penetrated the Euro-zone via the banking sector. 
German and French banks, exposed to toxic financial commodities from the USA and Britain, 
were the first to fail. Germany's economy has, and continues to have, one of the highest 
degrees of financialization in the EU.56 But Germany, having frozen wages from the mid-to-
late 1990s onwards, became the top exporting country in the Euro-zone amassing and 
recycling large surpluses at the expense of the periphery. Thus, she was in a position to 
displace the crisis of its exposed banking sector and impose an austerity agenda especially on 
the indebted periphery of the Euro-zone, effectively bailing out its failing banks.57  
Three issues are important here. First, the crisis in the Euro-zone spread from the 
Anglo-American financial core as a crisis of the imperialism of neo-liberal financialisation: this 
was a crisis of the function of core-core interpenetrative financial transactions. Second, 
Germany's deflationist agenda, inspired by an ordoliberal public policy, failed to protect its 
own economy, and that of the EU/Euro-zone, from this Anglo-American driven global financial 
crisis. Third, and given the nonchalant growth rates of the Euro-zone and the EU as a whole 
from the 1980s onwards, German-Austrian ordoliberal austerity failed to deliver sustainable 
growth, especially under EMU conditions. Austerity and growth are two irreconcilable 
magnitudes.58 However, what is of relevance for our purposes here is also the extent to which 
Germany's ordoliberal public policy is imperialist. To answer this question, we must 
understand the profound policy meaning and determinants of ordoliberalism and how it 
operates in the EU/Euro-zone and beyond. 
Ordoliberalism, as we saw earlier, is what others call "social market economy" or "The 
Freiburg School". Effectively, it is the German-Austrian version of neo-liberal economics. It 
emanated from academic circles during the inter-war period and influenced policy-making 
after the war. Ordoliberal Alfred Müller-Armack was Germany's chief negotiator for the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957. The literature that examines the way in which ordoliberal principles 
and rules have dominated the process of European integration becoming Treaty-bound 
norms for all member-states, especially Euro-zone members, is now vast.59 The main 
argument advanced is that Germany, following decades of (secret and open) negotiations 
primarily with France, has managed to transplant into the institutional architecture of the EU 
key policy tenets of its economic-institutional model, creating a pan-European system of 
supranational governance that resembles Germany's own. This (neo-liberal but more 
institutionally rigid and disciplinarian) model is based on strict anti-inflationist principles and 
a monetary policy protecting the Euro; central bank independence; de-politicisation of 
economic policy-making; and a rigid rule-making economic constitution inserted in Treaties 
                                                     
56 See, Lapavitsas, C. et al., “Beggar thyself…”, op.cit. 
57 Among others, Fouskas & Dimoulas, Greece…, op.cit.; Subasat, The Great…, op.cit.; Varoufakis, Y., Adults in 
the Room. My Battle with Europe's Deep Establishment (London: The Bodley Head, 2017). See also my review of 
Varoufakis in The Fabian Review, 129:2, summer 2017, p.28. 
58 Fouskas, Vassilis K. and Shampa Roy-Mukherjee, "Austerity and growth in Europe: Germany's impossible 
mission", Croatian Political Science Review, 53:4, (2016), pp.7-29. 
59 See, among others, Dyson, K. & Kevin Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht, (Oxford: O.U.P., 1999) Wilkinson, 
M., "The Reconstitution of Post-War Europe: Lineages of Authoritarian Liberalism", LSE Working Papers 05/2016, 
2016, Law Department; and a very fine collection of papers edited by Hien, J. and Christian Joerges (eds), 
Ordoliberalism, Law and the Rule of Economics, (Oxford: Bloomsbury, 2017). 
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and buttressed by an ensemble of "federated executives".60 This, in many respects, resembles 
the design of Friedrich Hayek in his rather forgotten essay, "The Economic Conditions of Inter-
State Federalism", who wrote in 1939.61 Wolfgang Streeck goes as far as to say that all major 
European institutions, such as the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the 
Council of Europe and even the European Court of Justice are forms of authoritarian 
governance protecting European free markets from democratic interference.62 A similar point 
of view from a juridical-philosophical perspective is developed by William E. Scheuerman.63 
From this perspective, the very meaning of the rule of law in conditions of ordoliberal (and 
neo-liberal) financialisation, in both the metropolises and the peripheries of capitalism, has 
nothing to do with justice, democracy, rights and civilization as liberal theorising in the field 
of international politics wants us to believe. "Rule of law" (for the core) and ideologies of 
"transitional justice" (for the embattled peripheries of the global South) are embodiments of 
the technocratic rules that the individual of a fragmenting neo-liberal society, at home and 
abroad, must internalise so that it can be inserted without any resistance to the supreme rule 
and disciplinarian realm of capital accumulation, expansion and "free" global markets. 
Working class family units and, with them, the Fordist wage, have to be undermined because 
they are not conducive to the devaluation of labour-power through the market mechanism, 
whereas they over-burden the fiscal component of the state. The "new citizen" in the West 
and the East, North and South, must feel co-responsible with the "entrepreneur" in a society 
in which the workers-consumers of both sexes are no longer defined contractually as 
employees but as associates, with no rights whatsoever while accepting ridiculously low 
wages and harsh working conditions.64 This is what Michel Foucault, who tackled the 
ordoliberal/neo-liberal phenomenon as early as the late 1970s and somewhat juxtaposed it 
with the Anglo-American neo-liberalism of the "Chicago School", called bio-politics. According 
to Foucault, without this bio-political dimension, which effectively summarises a new life-
style and a way of life, the ordoliberal project may not succeed.65 
These analyses should be read in tandem with contemporary events in various EU 
states, the impact of the Euro-zone crisis and the crisis of “Third Way” social democracy and 
democratic politics in the First World. In order to crack down on acts of terror, EU states 
impose, one after the other, "states of emergency" reinforcing the executive-authoritarian 
arm of the state, which acts already in an authoritarian manner by way of imposing austerity 
                                                     
60 Bonefeld, W., "Freedom and the strong state: On German ordoliberalism", New Political Economy, 17:5, 
(2012), 633-656; Bonefeld, W., "Authoritarian Liberalism: From Schmitt via Ordoliberalism to the Euro", 2017, 
forthcoming in Critical Sociology (mimeo). 
61 Hayek, F.A. (1939/1947), "The economic conditions of interstate federalism", in Individualism and Economic 
Order (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1947). 
62 Streeck, W., "Heller, Schmitt and the Euro", European Law Journal, 21:3, (2015), 361-370. 
63 Scheuerman, W., "Hermann Heller and the European Crisis: Authoritarian Liberalism Redux?", European Law 
Journal, 21:3, )2015), pp.302-312. 
64 This has started from the USA with the Wall-Mart and expanded quickly to the UK and elsewhere. This is the 
very meaning of Tony Blair's "stakeholder society", launched in Britain in the late 1990s and embraced by the 
ideologues of "Third Way". In this respect, it could be argued that Tony Blair, as leader of the Labour Party, 
contributed far more than Thatcher's Tory party in embedding ordoliberalism in the UK. In this milieu, liberal 
feminist narratives fit perfectly and the parties of the neo-revisionist “Third Way”, social democratic Left missed 
no opportunity to embrace such narratives, colonising class discourses and fragmenting the bloc of subaltern 
classes across society.  
65 Foucault, M., The Birth of Biopolitics (New York: Palgrave, 2010), pp.103-243.  
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and welfare retrenchment.66 Whereas Anglo-American neo-liberalism, as we saw earlier, is 
consubstantial with globalisation and the dominance of American-led finance since the 1980s 
in an increasingly securitised global environment after 9/11, ordoliberalism is consubstantial 
with the process of European "integration", the management of its current crisis and the 
hegemonic posture of Germany in those processes. Same as neo-liberalism, ordoliberalism, 
too, has an authoritarian core which is centred on the disciplinarian, de-politicised and 
technocratic rule-binding approach to the construction of the EU, a policy approach 
implemented by the “federated” executives of member-states in a completely undemocratic 
manner.67 
Having said this, and on the basis of our analyses on imperialism so far, we should 
stress that Germany's policy in the EU is imperialist for some good reasons. First, if export of 
capital and recycling of surpluses at the expense of peripheral states constitutes imperialism, 
then Germany's policy within the EU and beyond is imperialist. But in terms of monetary 
economics, it is more than imperialist; it is an imperial bondage reminiscent of classical 
colonialism because all Euro-zone members, regardless of their level of economic 
development or institutional capacity, are locked into a monetary union that provides no 
alternative for them to devalue their currencies and regain some meaningful 
competitiveness.68 The same was the case during the good years of the Gold Standard before 
WWI; and the bad years of the Gold Standard when Britain re-introduced it after WWI in a 
vain attempt to stabilise the world economy under its colonial rule, thus restoring its global 
supremacy. Moreover, peripheral states and countries in East/Central Europe and the Balkans 
are subject to direct and rather formal supervision of their budgetary and monetary 
institutions from the European Commission.  
All in all, the public policy of ordoliberal financialisation that guides the process of 
European "integration" and manages its crisis is a clear-cut imperialist policy. Apart from the 
Single Market mechanism, imperial arrangements of value transfer from the periphery to the 
core were institutionalised in the EU well before the current crisis and the launch of the Euro 
in 1999 (2001 for Greece). Appropriation of value by the core became more pronounced 
during the crisis, especially in peripheral countries, such as Greece. The announcement by the 
European Central Bank in October 2017 that it has so far made €7.8bn in profits from its Greek 
bond holdings reveals the true imperial nature of the so-called "bailouts" of Greece that EU 
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(read: German-Austrian ordoliberalism) and IMF (read: Anglo-Anglo-American neo-liberalism) 
policy-makers organised in return for massive austerity measures from 2010 onwards.69             
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Drawing from classic texts on imperialism and Marx's own analyses in Capital, we have shown 
that imperialism divulges internationally policies, norms, regulations and accumulation 
regimes that have previously prevailed at its imperial home-base. The aim is to export capital 
at minimal cost and risk, prevent and/or defuse possible crises of over-accumulation at home 
and, significantly, have the domestic socio-political orders of subaltern states subdued to the 
metropolitan socio-political order by, if possible, copying the policy principles and the way of 
life of that order. Imperialism is not just export of capital. It is export of a particular socio-
economic and political model of capital management and social life-style. It is in this context 
that "Open Door" and free trade are the preferred policy regimes for imperialism, although 
imperial metropolises "reserve the right" to have their "door closed" to others when they 
decide so and in order to protect their own market, as it happened in the inter-war period, 
the pioneer being the USA and not Nazi Germany. At any event, as Antonio Gramsci noted 
from his prison cell in the 1930s, social relations precede and do not follow international 
relations, that is, inter-state relations.70  
We have also established, especially by dwelling on Poulantzas's work, that the state 
at all periods in capitalist history is always present in the production and reproduction of 
socio-economic relations and, therefore, regimes of capitalist accumulation and public policy 
are interwoven. Further, what is embedded in those socio-economic and class relations and, 
by extension, in inter-state relations, is a profound degree of asymmetry and inequality 
embracing all transnational social and state actors involved. True, Thucydides, the father and 
icon of all realist approaches to IR theory, spoke of asymmetrical/uneven development of 
states and state power. But this is a smart observation/description and not a theory. In 
Marxian IR theory the states, same as the agents of social production, are not equal in terms 
of power, but unequal because of the inequality embedded in the social relations of 
production and reproduction. Thus, the process of their development as social formations is 
uneven and combined. This stems from the very - both national and transnational - reification 
of the value-form, which in itself is uneven and combined, inasmuch as any concentration of 
value on one class (the bourgeoisie) means less distribution of value to another class (the 
workers). Uneven (and combined) development, which as we saw earlier constitutes a 
fundamental concept for a Marxian theory of IR, is situated in the capitalist relations of 
production.71 Value transfers occur and are distributed from global and regional peripheries 
to core imperial states, because imperialism means appropriation of international value.   
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Brushing aside the topological-geographical connotations of the description, the duality of 
core-periphery pioneered by world system theorists makes sense because it reflects the 
reality of social, class and inter-state relations on the ground. The core is imperial and the 
periphery is subordinated to the core. This subordination, according to Poulantzas – who at 
this point subscribes to insights made by Frank, Baran and others – may even take on a triple 
form, economic, political and ideological, especially if comprador elements dominate the 
peripheral state. For example, Fouskas and Dimoulas, in their analysis of the Greek debt crisis, 
argue that Greece has been dominated by comprador elements in most part of its history.72 
Thus, they consider that the core-periphery concept, albeit descriptive, has analytical and 
heuristic value and should be part of a heterodox theory of IR. Similarly, the concept of surplus 
introduced by Baran and Sweezy is useful and can be incorporated in an innovative Marxist 
theory of IR and imperialism, not least because it can be statistically measured and assessed 
in the context of balance of payments and the current account of the states, a method 
successfully tested by Lapavitsas and others in their work. However, it should be noted that 
Lapavitsas, whose work falls within the remit of heterodox, rather than Marxist, economics is 
one of those scholars who fails to take issue with imperialism. His approach to money and 
contemporary financialisation is not placed in a framework of discussion on new imperialism 
and its crisis. 
As we have seen, this is not the case, with Leo Panitch, Peter Gowan, Alex Callinicos 
or David Harvey. New imperialism is led by the USA and, unlike pre-1945 European 
imperialisms, is informal. Moreover, it operates through hub-and-spoke arrangements and 
the hegemony of the dollar-Wall Street amalgamation that was established in the wake of the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, internationalising the Anglo-American model of 
neo-liberalism as a public policy that should be adopted by every single state in the world. In 
Gowan's work we find perhaps the most explicit connection between neo-liberalism and 
(new) imperialism. Harvey endorses Gowan's position but, as a geographer, sees more value 
in reconciling the Marxist thesis of over-accumulation crisis with the under-consumptionist 
argument of Luxemburg. He introduces the concept of accumulation by dispossession, 
explaining how capital and the global reproduction of American hegemony require 
perpetually new geographical spaces and bases for accumulation and value extraction. 
Resorting to war in order to appropriate these new spaces, and given the rise of China and 
the crisis of the EU, the new American imperialism (NAI) is sustainable only via war ventures. 
What is at stake, first and foremost, is the appropriation of the vast resources of Eurasia. 
Callinicos's significant intervention in the debate, admittedly influenced by Bukharin's work, 
concerns the Marxist appropriation of the realist notion of geopolitics that helps him bridge 
the (realist) inter-state system with global capital competition, defining imperialism as the 
intersection of economic and geopolitical competition.73 Stronger views about the decline of 
American imperialism, as we saw, come from Frank's latest work, ReOrient, and Arrighi's 
Adam Smith in Beijing. Panitch's and Gindin's panoramic contribution, The Making of Global 
Capitalism, stands on the extreme opposite.   
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German-Austrian ordoliberalism needs also "Open Door" conditions to operate successfully 
and project hegemony. This is the base of their cooperation with the USA at the global level, 
as it was the case at the Uruguay Round of 1994, when WTO was established. But 
ordoliberalism in itself does not have as yet the global reach Anglo-American neo-liberalism 
has through such institutions as the IMF, which is an extension of the American Treasury, or 
the WTO. The dollar remains the world's top reserve currency and, additionally, 
ordoliberalism does not have substantial military capacity and thus power projection 
capacity: the security and defence of Europe is still under NATO's, that is, America's grip.  
Ordoliberalism is Germany's key imperial project in the context of the EU and its 
immediate periphery, such as Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the MENA/Mediterranean 
region. Germany has secured "Open Door" in Europe via the single market and bilateral 
customs union agreements. As we have seen, she has managed to transplant its ordoliberal 
public policy model - de-politicisation of economic relations, independence of central bank, 
anti-inflation bias and export-led growth - across the EU/Euro-zone via the Treaty mechanism 
and after having prevailed over France in bilateral, both secret and open, negotiations. All 
EU/Euro-zone states have to transform their domestic socio-political orders according to the 
rules and norms embedded in the Treaties. The introduction of the Euro in 1999 (2001 for 
Greece) epitomises the domination of Germany in monetary and economic relations, since 
the entire continent was turned into a D-mark fixed exchange rates zone, enabling Germany 
and other European states of the core to recycle their surpluses at the expense of the 
periphery. It is thus beyond doubt that German-Austrian ordoliberalism, same as Anglo-
American neo-liberalism, is an imperial project. 
Neo-liberalism and ordoliberalism, on the one hand, and democracy, on the other, are 
incompatible magnitudes. We should recall again late Poulantzas's elaborations about the 
role of the state in the imperial transnational chain of contemporary capitalism as it 
transitioned from Keynesianism to neo-liberalism. Poulantzas diagnosed a deep authoritarian 
tendency in this process and provided a rigorous analysis of "authoritarian statism" that had 
sparked a great debate among left intellectuals in Britain at the time.74 He was not far-off the 
mark. Contemporary research on neo-liberalism and ordoliberalism – see, among others, the 
works by Andrew Gamble, Bob Jessop75 and Werner Bonefeld – confirms the inner-
relationship between neo-liberalism/ordoliberalism and authoritarian theory and practice at 
present. If the primary site of contemporary imperialism as international policy is the 
amalgamation between domestic accumulation regimes and the public policies of (German-
Austrian) ordoliberalism and (Anglo-American) neo-liberalism, then authoritarianism, too, 
before it goes European or global, is sourced domestically.  
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